In a recent media report widely circulated, the Department of State Services (DSS) provided an update on the prosecution of terror suspects.
In the said report, the DSS stated that several high-profile terrorism suspects are currently facing trial across the country as part of efforts to strengthen national security and ensure accountability.
The DSS, in a statement on Tuesday, disclosed that five men are being tried for their alleged involvement in the June 2022 attack on St. Francis Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo State, where over 40 worshippers lost their lives.
The agency also revealed that suspects linked to the June 2025 Yelwata massacre in Benue State, which claimed dozens of lives, are currently undergoing trial.
According to the DSS Director-General, Tosin Ajayi, the ongoing prosecutions reflect the commitment of security agencies to bringing perpetrators of terrorism to justice in line with the rule of law.
The DSS noted that the Federal High Court in Abuja will on November 19 continue the trial of two wanted terror suspects: Mahmud Muhammad Usman and Abubakar Abba, who were arrested during a high-risk operation in July.
As commendable as the DSS’s action is, one is constrained to do a critical analysis of this, especially considering the years involved in the trial of these terror suspects.
1. Delayed Justice and Lack of Transparency
The DSS claims that arrests and prosecutions have been ongoing since as far back as 2016 (e.g., Khalid Al-Barnawi) and as recently as July 2025 (Usman and Abba). Yet, this detailed update only emerged in November 2025. This long silence raises serious concerns about transparency and public accountability.
Terrorism prosecutions are of national interest. The absence of periodic briefings undermines public trust, suggesting that the timing of this release may be more about managing perception than ensuring justice. Worse still, many of these cases — including the Owo Church Massacre (2022) and the Yelwata Massacre (2025) — remain at early trial stages, despite the passage of time and reportedly strong evidence.
The DSS itself admits that delays stem from “procedural issues and lack of counsel” — a reflection of poor prosecutorial coordination and systemic inefficiency.
2. Slow Pace of Prosecution
Several of these cases (notably Khalid Al-Barnawi — arrested in 2016) have dragged on for nearly a decade with no convictions.
This suggests severe judicial inefficiency, poor coordination between the DSS and the Ministry of Justice, or even internal sabotage.
Even recent cases — such as the Owo Church Massacre (2022) and the Yelwata Massacre (2025) — are only at the arraignment or early trial stages, revealing a pattern of slow justice despite overwhelming evidence.
3. Selective Disclosure of Information
While the DSS listed names and charges, it failed to provide a broader context — such as the total number of ongoing investigations, details of convictions, plea deals, or any measures taken to support victims. This omission makes the press release look more like a self-congratulatory PR statement than a serious accountability report.
The DSS claims that “125 terrorists were convicted last year,” yet it provides no names, court records, or case references to substantiate this figure. Without verifiable data or independent confirmation, such statistics risk being perceived as arbitrary or inflated. A footnote or source citation would have strengthened the credibility of this claim — or at least acknowledged the need for greater transparency.
4. Questionable Custodial Practice
The DSS says suspects are “being remanded in the custody of the prosecuting agency.”
This means the DSS is acting as both prosecutor and jailer, which undermines the principle of separation of powers and increases the risk of abuse or torture.
5. Why Is the Government Feeding Terrorists with Public Funds?
Many of these suspects have been in custody for years without conviction, meaning the Nigerian taxpayer is effectively feeding, housing, and guarding terrorists.
Meanwhile, victims of terrorism and displaced citizens receive little or no compensation or support.
There is no mention of rehabilitation or deradicalisation — the cost burden is entirely on the state, with no visible progress.
6. Weakness in Messaging and Accountability
The DG’s statement that “we shall continue to make suspects accountable… in consonance with the rule of law” sounds hollow when trials drag on endlessly and convictions are scarce.
There’s no mention of coordination with international partners, despite the suspects having foreign jihadist links (Libya, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab).
Why hasn’t Nigeria leveraged intelligence-sharing or extradition support?
7. Possible Inconsistencies
The release states that Mamuda trained in Libya, but earlier, only Mahmud Usman and Abba were mentioned.
The sudden introduction of “Mamuda” looks like an editorial or factual error — was Mamuda meant to be Mahmud (Usman)? Such inconsistencies weaken credibility.
“Nine-count terrorism charge marked FHC/ABJ/CR/301/2025” — but the Owo attack happened in 2022. Why was it filed three years later? This further shows slow investigation and prosecution cycles.
8. Lack of Human or Policy Context
The statement does not address:
Why do these terrorist cells keep resurfacing across Nigeria?
What reforms have been made in intelligence gathering or community policing?
How victims are being protected or compensated;
How porous borders continue to aid the recruitment and escape of terrorists.
9. Tone and Intent
The entire release reads more like a scorecard than a public safety update.
It praises DSS diligence without acknowledging institutional weaknesses or lessons learned — a one-sided narrative.
10. Broader National Implications
These repeated delays, coupled with costly prosecutions and prolonged detentions, risk turning Nigeria’s justice system into a holding cell rather than a corrective mechanism.
It also raises suspicion that some suspects might be informally freed or recycled, as has been alleged in the past in conflict zones like Borno and Zamfara.
In Summary — Questions That Demand Answers:
1. Why did it take the DSS so long to make this public?
2. Why have trials dragged for years despite overwhelming evidence?
3. Why are suspects being detained indefinitely at public expense?
4. Why is there no transparency on convictions or victim support?
5. Why are security agencies duplicating functions with little coordination?
6. Why do terror prosecutions always peak before political transitions or international pressure?
