Exclusive analysis reveals a $782,000 Dubai cell, a mysterious eighth suspect, and the questions Abuja refuses to answer, KEHINDE ADEGOKE reports.
The United States Department of the Treasury has imposed sweeping sanctions on eight Nigerian nationals, freezing their assets and effectively blacklisting them from the global financial system. Yet six days after the February 10, 2026 announcement, Nigeria’s government has offered nothing but silence.
An exclusive investigation by TheDiggerNews into a comprehensive 3,000-page document released by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reveals unprecedented details about Nigerian nationals allegedly linked to international terrorism and cybercrime networks—details that raise troubling questions about what Abuja knows, and why it isn’t talking.
The document, published in the Federal Register (91 FR 6979-6981), represents one of the most significant enforcement actions against Nigerian nationals in recent years. The sanctioned individuals face complete asset freezes, bans on transactions with U.S. persons, and potential criminal penalties of up to $20 million and 30 years’ imprisonment for violations.
THE SECRET DOCUMENT: WHAT OFAC REVEALS
The Office of Foreign Assets Control—the Treasury Department’s enforcement arm responsible for administering economic sanctions—issued these designations under Executive Order 13224, the main legal authority for combating terrorist financing.
According to the official notice, all property and interests in property of these individuals within U.S. jurisdiction are now blocked. U.S. persons—including American citizens, permanent residents, and entities—are prohibited from engaging in any transactions with them. This extends to entities in which the sanctioned individuals own 50% or more.
“The implications are severe,” said a Washington-based sanctions expert who spoke on condition of anonymity. “These individuals are now effectively locked out of the international banking system. Any financial institution doing business with them risks secondary sanctions.”
THE BOKO HARAM NETWORK: SEVEN NAMES EXPOSED
Our inquiry reveals that seven of the eight sanctioned Nigerians are directly linked to Boko Haram, the terrorist organisation that has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions across Northeast Nigeria.
Salih Yusuf Adamu: The Dubai Financier
Born: August 23, 1990 | Designation: SDGT (Specially Designated Global Terrorist)
Perhaps the most significant name on the list, Adamu, was convicted in the United Arab Emirates in 2022 alongside five other Nigerians for establishing a Boko Haram financing cell in Dubai. The group attempted to transfer a staggering $782,000 to insurgents in Nigeria—one of the largest known terrorist financing operations originating from the Gulf region.
Intelligence sources indicate that Adamu’s network used sophisticated money laundering techniques, routing funds through multiple jurisdictions before attempting to deliver them to Boko Haram operatives in northeastern Nigeria. His conviction in the UAE represented a rare international prosecution of Boko Haram financiers, but his inclusion on the OFAC list suggests American authorities believe his network goes beyond what was prosecuted in Dubai.
- Babestan Oluwole Ademulero: The Mysterious Kingpin
Born: March 4, 1953 | Aliases: Wole A. Babestan, Olatunde Irewole Shofeso | Designation: SDNTK (Narcotics Trafficking Kingpin)
At 73 years old, Ademulero is the oldest individual on the sanctions list and carries a unique designation: Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficking Kingpin. The use of multiple aliases—including Wole A. Babestan and Olatunde Irewole Shofeso—suggests a decades-long career in illicit acts.
His designation elicits important questions about the nexus between narcotics trafficking and terrorism financing in Nigeria, a connection that law enforcement agencies have long suspected but rarely documented publicly.
3 & 4. The Al-Barnawi Brothers: Boko Haram Leadership
Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar Al-Barnawi (Ba Idrisa): Born 1989-1994 in Maiduguri, Borno State | Abu Musab Al-Barnawi (Habib Yusuf): Born 1990-1995 | Designation: SDGT | Status: Boko Haram Leaders
The Al-Barnawi brothers represent the direct leadership of Boko Haram. Abu Musab Al-Barnawi, in particular, is identified as a senior Boko Haram leader—a designation that places him among the most dangerous individuals on the sanctions list.
Both brothers hail from Maiduguri, the Borno State capital that has been the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency since 2009. Their inclusion on the OFAC list suggests they remain active in terrorist actions despite years of military pressure.
5. Khalid Al-Barnawi: The Veteran Operative
Born: 1976 | Aliases: Abu Hafsat, Mohammed Usman | Place: Maiduguri, Borno State
At 50 years old, Khalid Al-Barnawi is likely one of the more senior operatives in the Boko Haram network. His use of multiple aliases—Abu Hafsat and Mohammed Usman—indicates operational security practices typical of key targets.
Born in Maiduguri in 1976, he would have witnessed the city’s transformation from a peaceful regional centre to the birthplace of one of Africa’s deadliest terrorist organisations.
6. Ibrahim Ali Alhassan: The Gulf Facilitator
Born: January 31, 1981 | Current Location: Abu Dhabi, UAE | Nationality: Nigerian
Alhassan’s current residence in Abu Dhabi places him at the centre of Boko Haram’s Gulf-based support network. His presence in the UAE, alongside the previously mentioned Salih Yusuf Adamu, suggests a combined effort to establish financial and administrative support cells in the Emirates.
This geographic positioning allows terrorist financiers to exploit the UAE’s position as a global financial hub while continuing distance from active combat zones in Nigeria.

THE CYBERCRIME CONNECTION: A NEW DIMENSION
7. Nnamdi Orson Benson: The Cyber Criminal
Born: March 21, 1987 | Designation: CYBER2 (Significant Cyber Criminal Activity)
Benson stands apart from the other sanctioned individuals by his unique CYBER2 designation, which indicates involvement in significant cyber-related criminal activity. This represents a new frontier in OFAC enforcement actions against Nigerians, indicating growing concerns about the intersection of cybercrime with other illicit activities.
Although particular details of Benson’s alleged cybercrimes are undisclosed in the public OFAC notice, his inclusion alongside terrorism-linked individuals raises concerns about possible connections between cyber criminal networks and terrorist financing.
“Nigerian cybercriminals have increasingly advanced operations, and there are growing concerns about funds from cyber fraud being channelled to extremist groups,” noted a cybersecurity analyst familiar with West African operations.
THE MISSING EIGHTH: AN INTELLIGENCE GAP
OFAC has confirmed that eight Nigerians were sanctioned in the February 10, 2026, action. However, only seven names have been fully disclosed in publicly available sources. The identity of the eighth individual remains classified or redacted from public documents.
This omission is highly unusual in OFAC actions, which typically provide comprehensive public disclosure to enable financial institutions and other entities to comply with sanctions requirements. The redaction of one name suggests either ongoing intelligence operations or diplomatic sensitivities that prevent full public disclosure at this time.
NO NIGERIAN COMPANIES SANCTIONED—BUT QUESTIONS REMAIN
Conspicuously missing from the February 10 sanctions list are any Nigerian-based companies or corporate entities. The OFAC document instead targets entities in Lebanon, Panama, and Turkey with alleged Hezbollah connections:
Jood Sarl (Lebanon) – jewellery and precious metals wholesaler
Brilliance Maritime Ventures S.A. (Panama) – shipping company
Platinum Group International Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Turkey)
Sea Surf Shipping Limited (Turkey) – marine operations
However, OFAC regulations stipulate that any entity owned 50% or more by a sanctioned individual is automatically blocked, even without explicit designation. This means that if any of the sanctioned Nigerians have ownership stakes in companies—whether registered in Nigeria or elsewhere—those entities could face de facto sanctions without public announcement.
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS: THE PENALTIES ARE SEVERE
The legal consequences of these sanctions go well beyond simple asset freezes. Under Executive Order 13224 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), violations carry among the harshest penalties in U.S. law:
Criminal penalties: Up to $20 million in fines and 30 years imprisonment
Civil penalties: Up to $356,579 per violation (adjusted annually for inflation)
Asset forfeiture: All property involved in violations is subject to seizure
Secondary sanctions: Financial institutions risk losing U.S. market access
“These are not symbolic measures,” explained Dr Ibrahim Mohammed, a sanctions law expert at Georgetown University. “OFAC has enforcement authority worldwide. Any bank, anywhere in the world, that processes a dollar transaction involving these individuals can face devastating penalties. The U.S. dollar’s dominance in global finance makes these sanctions extraordinarily effective.”

NIGERIA’S DEAFENING SILENCE
Perhaps most troubling is the complete absence of any official Nigerian government reaction to these sanctions. Six days after the OFAC announcement, there have been:
No statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
No comment from the Office of the National Security Adviser
No acknowledgement from the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
No parliamentary questions or investigations
This silence is especially troubling given Nigeria’s stated commitment to countering terrorism and its participation in international counter-terrorism initiatives. The sanctioning of seven individuals with Boko Haram links amounts to a significant indictment of Nigeria’s domestic security failures, yet the government appears unwilling or unable to acknowledge this development publicly.
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS: BEYOND NIGERIA’S BORDERS
The geographic spread of the sanctioned individuals—from Maiduguri to Dubai to Abu Dhabi—illustrates the transnational nature of terrorist financing networks. This entails significant implications for West Africa as well as the broader Sahel region:
Gulf States as Financial Hubs
The presence of multiple sanctioned individuals in the UAE suggests that Gulf states have become pivotal nodes in Boko Haram’s financial infrastructure. Despite the UAE’s cooperation in prosecuting Salih Yusuf Adamu in 2022, the continued presence of Ibrahim Ali Alhassan in Abu Dhabi indicates that the network remains active.
International Banking Exposure
Nigerian banks with correspondent relationships with U.S. financial institutions now face heightened compliance requirements. Any transaction involving these individuals could trigger regulatory action not only from OFAC but also from Nigerian financial regulators.
ECOWAS Coordination Failures
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has established mechanisms to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts, but the ability of these individuals to operate across multiple jurisdictions reveals significant gaps in regional cooperation and information sharing.
CRITICAL QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN UNANSWERED
Despite extensive investigation, numerous questions remain unanswered:
Who is the eighth sanctioned individual?
The redaction of one name from public disclosure suggests either active intelligence operations or high-level political sensitivities. This individual may be cooperating with authorities or may pose such a significant intelligence risk that public identification would compromise ongoing operations.
What Nigerian companies are indirectly affected?
The 50% ownership rule means that any companies controlled by these individuals are subject to automatic sanctions, even without an explicit OFAC designation. Nigerian authorities have made no effort to identify or publicly disclose which domestic companies might be affected.
How much money has been frozen?
OFAC hasn’t disclosed the total value of assets frozen as a result of these designations. Given that Salih Yusuf Adamu alone attempted to transfer $782,000 in a single operation, the cumulative financial exposure could be substantial.
Are there more designations coming?
OFAC sanctions often come in waves as investigators uncover network connections. The February 10 action may represent only the first tranche of a larger enforcement campaign against Boko Haram’s financial infrastructure.
CONCLUSION: A NATIONAL SECURITY CRISIS IGNORED
The February 10, 2026, OFAC sanctions represent one of the most significant U.S. enforcement actions against Nigerian nationals in recent memory. The designation of seven individuals with direct Boko Haram links, along with one cybercriminal, exposes the transnational nature of Nigeria’s security threats.
Yet Nigeria’s response has been complete silence. No government statement. No parliamentary inquiry. No public accountability.
This silence is itself a scandal. At a time when Nigeria claims to be winning the war against Boko Haram, the United States has publicly identified seven Nigerian nationals actively supporting the terrorist organisation. The consequences for Nigeria’s international credibility, its banking sector, and its security agreements are considerable.
As this publication goes to press, the sanctioned individuals remain free to operate within Nigeria, with their assets unfrozen by Nigerian authorities and their activities unconstrained by domestic law enforcement. The United States has done what Nigeria will not: hold these individuals accountable.
The question now is whether Nigerian authorities will act on this intelligence or continue to ignore one of the most serious counter-terrorism revelations in years.

