Middle powers spanning Europe, Asia, and the Pacific launch a voluntary pact to safeguard infrastructure carrying 99% of global data traffic, amid rising incidents of cable damage and geopolitical tensions.
Kehinde Adegoke | SCMP
Seventeen nations spanning Europe, Asia, and the Pacific have launched a landmark pact to safeguard vital undersea cables that carry 99% of global internet traffic, a move underscoring shared vulnerabilities but marked by the conspicuous absence of the United States and China.
Singapore’s defence chief tells the Shangri-La Dialogue the pact aims to explore potential areas of collaboration and share best practices.
Seventeen countries have agreed to collaborate on defence strategies for critical marine infrastructure such as undersea cables, an effort that analysts warn may be undermined by the absence of superpower involvement.
At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Saturday, defence ministers and representatives from these countries attended the launch of the Guiding Principles for Underwater Infrastructure Defence Exchanges (Guide), which aims to bring countries together to explore potential areas of collaboration to enhance security.
The 17 nations that endorsed the Guide include Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Qatar, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
China and the United States were notably absent from the list.
At the launch, Singapore’s Defence Minister Chan Chun Sing said waterways were not just avenues for trade but also housed critical underwater infrastructure that provided connectivity for energy and telecommunications.
“Today, if we are honest with ourselves, we will know that we have quite a lot of work to do to establish the international norms on how we can lay those critical infrastructures … but more importantly, how to maintain them and how to prevent people from disrupting them,” he said.
Without naming countries, Chan noted that “many more” expressed interest in joining the Guide, but some needed domestic approval, and the hope was that the launch would start conversations and share best practices.
The Guide, which is voluntary and non-binding, outlines principles such as adherence to sovereignty and jurisdiction, in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
It also lists potential areas of cooperation, such as inter-regional information sharing and enhanced crisis response.
Barbora Valockova, a research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy’s Centre on Asia and Globalisation, said the countries shared similar vulnerabilities and interests as highly digitalised, trade-dependent economies.
“For them, even a short-lived disruption of data flows or energy connectors can have outsized economic and political costs,” she said.
Critical underwater infrastructure has been a key topic at this year’s conference, following its recent spotlight amid incidents that underscored the growing vulnerability of submarine cables.
Earlier on Saturday, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles said the seabed had become a “battlefield”.
“We have witnessed a series of attacks against subsea critical infrastructure at a scale and frequency that is historically unprecedented,” he said.
“Maybe all of these were accidents, but even if they were, it highlights the vulnerability of this crucial part of the globe’s infrastructure.”
He cited recent incidents, including the severing of a subsea cable in the Baltic Sea – a fibre optic line connecting Helsinki and Estonia – on the final day of last year. Taiwan reported five cases of seabed cable damage last year, an increase from three the previous year.
Such underwater fibre-optic cables carry roughly 99 per cent of intercontinental data traffic.
Last month, a media outlet affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps highlighted that the Strait of Hormuz functioned as an essential corridor for internet communications.
The outlet warned that damage to cable systems would trigger a “digital catastrophe” and inflict colossal losses on southern Persian Gulf countries that are heavily reliant on undersea cables.
Analysts said that recent disruptions likely shaped the agreement, which was significant as it signalled acknowledgement of common security interests and a willingness to cooperate across regions.
Collin Koh, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies‘ Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, said the Guide was a “noteworthy first step” towards more concrete collaboration, and could gauge the appetite for further security cooperation on critical water infrastructure.
The Guide and span of countries involved could help spark greater global interest and spur concrete policy actions to secure infrastructure.
Chris Gardiner, chief executive of Australia-based Institute for Regional Security, said collaboration between middle powers could secure critical underwater infrastructure through collective sea-policing and control, and cost-effectively deliver advanced technologies.
“It can also strengthen and secure their relative strategic autonomy in a disordered world where great powers seem to be moving to establish spheres of control,” he said.
However, observers warn that the absence of superpowers may lead to a lack of capabilities and knowledge.
Koh noted that countries would not be able to tap the significant technological knowledge and capabilities the superpowers possessed.
“The absence of the major powers in any collaborative initiative is not ideal given their heft in capacity and influence,” said Elina Noor, a non-resident scholar in the Asia Programme at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
But the agreement could signal that the major powers might not always be counted on in times of need and could be a hedge that cooperating could be more manageable without them, she added.
For Valockova, launching the Guide without China, the US or Russia risks being read as a “soft-balancing move” by like-minded states.
While agreeing on principles was relatively straightforward, the challenge lay in implementation, she said, noting that states could face difficulties building surveillance systems and repair capacity.
With most subsea cables privately owned, defence ministries would have to align with regulators, operators and insurers, she added.
“Without that public-private alignment, the Guide risks remaining an important political signal but a modest operational tool in a domain where the legal framework and attribution mechanisms remain weak,” she said.